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Abstract 
 
Objective:  The new contract for primary care in the UK offers fee-for-service payments for a 
wide range of activities in a quality outcomes framework, with payments designed to reflect 
likely workload.  This study aims to explore the link between these financial incentives and the 
likely population health gains. 
 
Methods: The study examines a subset of eight preventive interventions covering 38 of the 
81 clinical indicators in the quality framework.  The maximum payment for each service was 
calculated and compared with the likely population health gain in terms of lives saved per 
100,000 population based on evidence from McColl et al. (1998). 
 
Results: Maximum payments for the eight interventions examined make up 57% of the sum 
total maximum payment for all clinical interventions in the quality outcomes framework.  There 
appears to be no relationship between pay and health gain across these eight interventions.  
Two of the eight interventions (warfarin in atrial fibrillation and statins in primary prevention) 
receive no incentive. 
 
Conclusions:  Payments in the new contract do not reflect likely population health gain.  
There is a danger that clinical activity may be skewed towards high-workload activities that 
are only marginally effective, to the detriment of more cost effective activities.  If improving 
population health is the primary goal of the NHS, then fee-for-service incentives should be 
designed to reflect likely health gain rather than likely workload. 
 
Keywords: health policy, incentive payments, primary care, quality, UK 
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1. Introduction 
 
The new General Medical Services (GMS) contract, signed in February 2003, is a major 
investment in UK primary care of £8.0 billion over the next three years [1].  It also represents 
a significant shift in the mode of funding for primary care practices, with increased use of fee-
for-service (FFS) to incentivise quality improvement [2, 3]. 
 
The new contract provides direct financial incentives to the majority (around 65%) of UK 
general practitioners (GPs) who are self-employed partners - known as “principals” - and who 
share in the profits and capital gains of their practices.  The increasing number of salaried 
GPs employed by practices may also benefit indirectly, to the extent that the new FFS 
payments may allow practices to pay higher salaries and/or to offer a share of the additional 
profits. 
 
FFS payments were originally introduced in the 1990 GP contract for selected public health 
services including vaccinations, immunizations and cervical cancer screening [4].  The new 
2003 contract greatly extends the range and overall magnitude of FFS payment.  It awards 
payments for a wide range of services deemed to improved quality of care, which are 
specified in a “quality outcomes framework” (QOF).  This contains a blizzard of 151 quality 
indicators in four broad areas: clinical (81 indicators), organisational (56 indicators), additional 
services (10 indicators), and patient experience (4 indicators).  The indicators were selected 
from existing evidence-based schemes such as the Royal College of General Practitioners 
Quality Team Development and Practice Accreditation Scheme [1].  The new QOF payments 
apply to all GP practices, including ones opting for locally negotiated Personal Medical 
Services (PMS) contracts based on raw capitation as well as ones opting for General Medical 
Services (GMS) contracts based on risk-adjusted capitation. 
 
The relative payment for each quality indicator depends on a points system designed to 
reflect likely workload.  Each quality indicator is allocated a maximum payment.  Typically, 
points are awarded in proportion to the achieved level of the indicator, with a graduated scale 
of payments that starts above a minimum threshold level and ends once a maximum 
threshold level has been reached.  For example, the clinical quality indicator CHD 2 is defined 
as “The percentage of patients with newly diagnosed angina (diagnosed after 1 April 2003) 
who are referred for exercise testing and/or specialist assessment”.  For this indicator, the two 
payment stage thresholds are set at 25% and 90%; and the maximum payment is seven 
points.  Practices scoring between minimum and maximum thresholds get a proportion of the 
maximum points available.  For example, if a practice scored 45% in the above indicator CHD 
2, they would receive 20/65th of the maximum 7 points available.  
 
Over half of the maximum points (550 out of 1,050) are allocated to clinical performance (see 
pages 22-23 of reference [1]).  The monetary value of a point depends on practice list size 
and demographics, but for an “average” practice with a patient population of 5,500 and three 
whole time principals, the maximum payment in the clinical area alone will amount to £66,000 
per annum from 2005/6.  This is based on an “average” practice payment of £120 per point in 
2005/6, rising from £75 per point in 2004/5 (see page 20 of reference [1]).  This is not pure 
profit, however, since the practice bears the additional costs of improving and documenting its 
quality indicators, such as investment in new staff and IT systems, as well as increased 
pension costs for salaried GPs. 
 
The contract’s supporting documentation includes extensive evidence for the clinical 
effectiveness of all clinical activities that attract quality payment.  However, no evidence is 
provided about the development of the points system that determines the strength of incentive 
for different activities.  The main principle underlying development of the points system is 
stated, however.  The points system was designed “for rewarding GPs and their staff for the 
volume and quantity of work done” [3, 5].  The value of the points for each area was 
determined by two small groups of general practitioners estimating the work required to 
achieve the different quality criteria [3].  This approach – i.e. basing rewards on perceptions of 
likely workload – has the advantage that it encourages GPs to give equal priority to all quality 
indicators, rather than prioritising the less burdensome ones.  A possible disadvantage, 
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however, is that likely workload may not reflect likely benefit – in particular, likely health gain.  
If so, activity may be skewed towards high-reward high-workload areas with low gains to 
population health, and away from low-reward low-workload areas with high gains to 
population health. 
 
An alternative approach would be to base payments on likely gain to population health.  This 
approach – i.e. rewarding achievement, rather than effort – would encourage GPs to prioritise 
activities with high benefits to population health.  One possible disadvantage is that it would 
be hard to set payments in the areas of primary care activity where the evidence base is so 
thin and professional consensus so lacking that extreme uncertainty surrounds any point 
estimate of likely health gain.  Nevertheless, if likely workload can be estimated by clinical 
experts – as happened in the design of the new contract – than so can likely health gain. 
 
This study investigates whether or not these two approaches - rewarding likely workload and 
rewarding likely health gain are equivalent in practice, focusing on areas of practice where 
robust evidence on health gain is readily available.  It explores the link between the rewards 
for different clinical services, based on likely workload, and the likely gains to population 
health.  
 
2. Methods 
 
Our study uses published estimates of the population health gains from eight broad 
categories of prescribing intervention.  These estimates were reported in a study by McColl et 
al. which developed a set of evidence based quality indicators for primary care [6].  That study 
has been widely cited and endorsed (25 citations listed on the BMJ website as at 7 December 
2004).  To estimate the corresponding strength of financial incentive in the new contract for 
each intervention, we list all the clinical indicator quality payments associated with the 
intervention and then add up the associated points.  This enables us to examine whether or 
not there is any association between population health gain and strength of financial incentive 
across the eight McColl interventions. 
 
The McColl interventions are mainly in the area of cardiac care, and cover only 38 of the 81 
clinical indicators in the GP contract.  However, because the evidence base for the McColl 
interventions is strong and readily available, it provides an excellent test case for the contract 
as a whole.  If there is any relationship between pay and likely health gain in the contract, one 
would expect that relationship to be strongest in those areas where there is the strongest 
published evidence of population health gain. 
 
Furthermore, the McColl quality interventions are of interest in their own right.  A Kings Fund 
review of quality indicators for primary care identified the McColl et al. methodology as both 
evidence based and linked to outcomes [7].   Of the quality indicators described in that 
review, we would argue that the McColl indicators are the only ones that meet all five of the 
following criteria for quality indicators in primary care identified by Dixon et al. [8]: 
1. Measurable aspects of care 
2. Based on scientific evidence 
3. Aspects of care within the control of the practitioners for whom they are designed 
4. Appropriate for the clinical situation for which they are devised 
5. Can be used to highlight areas for further investigation. 
The McColl indicators all involve routinely recorded prescribing interventions to defined 
groups of “high risk” patients for which there is strong evidence of population health gain.  
Each quality indicator is defined as the proportion of the high risk patients in the practice 
population recorded as receiving the intervention.  An example of this is the number of 
patients with heart failure receiving treatment with an ACE inhibitor drug. 
 
In order to compare potential health gain across different areas, McColl et al. use the 
common denominator of a number of lives saved per year per 100,000 population for the 
average practice.  This can be thought of as the number of lives potentially saveable in an 
average population of 100,000 ordinary people (of whom only a proportion will be patients 
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eligible to receive the intervention).  From the literature, they obtain raw estimates of the 
number of lives saved per unit of time (e.g. per 90 days, per year and per four years).  These 
figures are then converted into a number of lives saved per year, making the assumption that 
lives saved are linearly related with time. 
 
We compare the McColl et al. estimates of lives saved for each intervention with our own 
estimates of the corresponding financial payments in the new GMS contract.  Our estimates 
were made by mapping the (small-scale) QOF indicators onto the relevant McColl 
interventions.  The total points associated with each intervention were then converted into 
financial payments based on the assumption that payment for each quality point will be £120 
per year for a general practice of average size [1].  The details of our payment calculations 
are displayed in table 1, which lists the quality payments relating to each of the McColl 
indicators. 
 
Table 1: Incentive points for clinical performance in the GMS contract  
McColl indicator 
 
 
(1) 
GMS contract indicator 
 
(2) 
Contract 
points 
 
(3) 
Total points for 
each indicator 
(4) 
Maximum 
payment per 
year (£) 
= (4) * £120 
LVD1 4 20 
LVD2 6  
ACE in heart failure 
LVD3 10  
£2400 
CHD12 7 30 
STROKE10 2  
DM18 3  
COPD8 6  
Influenza immunization in 
over 65s 
ASTHMA7 12  
£3600 
CHD3 7 87 
CHD4 4  
STROKE3 3  
STROKE4 2  
BP2 10  
BP3 10  
DM3 3  
DM4 5  
COPD4 6  
COPD5 6  
ASTHMA3 6  
ASTHMA4 6  
ASTHMA5 6  
RECORDS10 6  
RECORDS16 5  
Stop smoking advice and 
nicotine replacement 
  
INFORMATION5 2  
£10440 
CHD5 7 141 
CHD6 19  
STROKE5 2  
STROKE6 5  
BP4 20  
BP5 56  
DM11 3  
DM12 17  
RECORDS11 10  
Screening and treatment 
of hypertension 
INFORMATION5 2  
£16920 
CHD9 7 11 Aspirin in ischaemic heart 
disease STROKE9 4  
£1320 
Warfarin in atrial fibrillation 0 0 0 £0 
CHD7 7 23 Statins in ischaemic heart 
disease    CHD8 16  
£2760 
Statins in primary 
prevention 
0 0 0 £0 
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The data are presented both in tabular format and graphically, using a scatterplot, to allow 
visual comparison of pay against health gain for the eight McColl interventions.  Given the 
small sample size, formal statistical tests have low power to detect any relationship between 
pay and health gain.  For completeness, however, formal statistical tests were carried out – 
although these tests must of course be treated with caution.  The Shapiro-Wilk W test was 
used to test for normality in both variables.  Since one variable was not normally distributed, a 
non-parametric Spearman rank correlation test was used in addition to a Pearson correlation 
test.  A two-sided test was used to test the null hypothesis of no relationship between pay and 
likely health gain against the alternative hypothesis of some (positive or negative) 
relationship.  The tests were carried out using SPSS version 11.0. 
 
3. Results 
 
Table 2: Potential health gains and potential payments for the McColl interventions 
Intervention 
(number relates to graph) 
Maximum lives 
saved per unit of 
time 
Maximum lives saved 
per 100,000 per 
year1 
(% of total) 
Maximum 
payment for 
typical practice 
per year (£) 2 
(% of total) 
1. ACE in heart failure 76 per 90 days 308.0 (41%) 2,400 (06%) 
2. Influenza immunization in over 65s 146 per year       146.0 (20%) 3,600 (10%) 
3. Stop smoking advice and nicotine 
replacement 
120 per year 120.0 (16%) 10,440 (28%) 
4. Screening and treatment of 
hypertension 
286 per 4 years 71.0 (10%) 16,920 (45%) 
5. Aspirin in ischaemic heart disease 48 per year 48.0 (06%) 1,320 (04%) 
6. Warfarin in atrial fibrillation 33 per year 33.0 (04%) 0 (00%) 
7. Statins in ischaemic heart disease 69 per 5 years 13.8 (02%) 2,760 (07%) 
8. Statins in primary prevention 14 per 5 years 2.8 (00%) 0 (00%) 
Total  742.6 (100%)  37,440 (100%) 
 
1 Based on assumption that lives saved are linear with time 
2 See calculations in table 1 
 
Table 2 displays the lives saved calculations (from McColl et al.) alongside our own estimate 
of the corresponding payments in the new GMS contract. 
 
Potential lives saved ranged from 2.8 to 308 per 100,000 population per year for different 
interventions; potential quality payments ranged from zero to £17,280 per year.  Figure 1 
presents a scatterplot of pay against health gain for the eight McColl indicators. 
 
There would appear to be no obvious relationship between pay and health gain across the 
eight McColl interventions.  Some interventions (e.g. ACE in heart failure) yield a relatively 
large health gain yet attract relatively low payment.  By contrast, other interventions (e.g. 
screening and treatment of hypertension) attract a relatively high payment for a relatively low 
health gain. 
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Figure 1: Scatterplot of potential quality payments against potential lives saved for the 
eight McColl interventions 
 
 
Formal statistical tests do not contradict this visual impression.  Neither Pearson nor 
Spearman correlation tests reached significance at 5% (Table 4). We therefore cannot reject 
the null hypothesis of no relationship between pay and health gain. 
 
 
Table 3: Shapiro-Wilk tests for normality of data 
 P-value 
Potential lives saved per 100,000 population 0.076 
Potential quality payment 0.020 
 
 
Table 4: Correlation tests for relationship between potential number of lives saved and 
potential incentive payment 
 
Correlation coefficient (Spearmans rho, 2 tailed) 0.527 
P-value 0.180 
Correlation coefficient (Pearson’s r, 2 tailed) 0.083 
P-value 0.846 
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4. Discussion 
 
There are at least three weaknesses in our approach.  First, it only covers a subset of the 
QOF indicators – albeit an important subset that accounts for 57% (£37,440 per annum) of 
the maximum possible payment for all clinical indicators and, according to McColl et al., has 
the potential to save 742 lives per year per 100,000 population.  Second, population health 
gain is defined in terms of “number of lives saved”, which does not take into account how 
many years of life are saved or of what quality.  Regrettably, many of the “lives saved” by the 
McColl interventions may be frail elderly individuals with relatively short life expectancy and 
quality of life.  So in future, it may be preferable to take into account both the length and 
quality of life saved – i.e. to define health gain in terms of quality adjusted life years (QALYs).  
However, a more comprehensive QALY gain dataset is not yet available.  Third, the McColl 
data is now six years old and there have been minor changes in the evidence base.  For 
example, beta blockers are now used routinely in heart failure [9] – although the new GMS 
contract also fails to include this quality marker. 
 
Our central finding is that, across the eight individual McColl services, there appears to be no 
relationship between the incentive payment (based on likely workload) and the likely health 
gain – either through visual inspection or formal statistical tests.  In this case, likely workload 
does not appear to be well correlated with likely health gain.  Furthermore, two of the McColl 
interventions – the use of warfarin in atrial fibrillation to prevent stroke and statins in primary 
prevention – receives no quality incentive payment at all.  This contrasts with other areas that 
receive incentives but have no robust evidence base, such as personal learning plans.   
 
This finding suggests that there is a real danger the incentive payments may skew activity 
towards highly-reward labour-intensive activities with relatively low benefits to population 
health.  Activities that deliver greater health gains but receive less (or no) financial incentive 
may be downplayed: what is not incentivised may be marginalized [10]. 
  
We propose that incentive payment schemes such as the new GMS contract should aim to 
relate rewards to achievement of benefits to the patient – and, in particular, population health 
gain.  In doing so, it is not enough to demonstrate that an activity has some effect on 
population health – however small – and then spend money – however much – in order to 
encourage that activity.  The size of the health gain matters.  So does the size of the incentive 
payment.  This is because incentive payments have opportunity costs to population health of 
two kinds.  First, money spent on incentive payments could be used for other activities that 
improve health (in primary care or elsewhere).  Second, scarce staff time directed towards the 
QOF activities by FFS incentives will be diverted away from other activities in primary care 
that may improve health.  If pay fails to mirror health gain performance, then there is a danger 
that clinical activity may be skewed towards costly but only marginally effective interventions 
to the detriment of low-cost and high-benefit activities.  Of course, achieved benefits other 
than health gain may also be worth incentivising - for example, patient experience.  It is 
noteworthy in this respect that points for patient experience are currently awarded merely for 
recording information, and do not depend on the scores achieved. 
 
It is inevitable that the new contract will lead to an increase in the QOF activities covered by 
FFS payment.  But will it improve population health?  Ultimately, answering this central 
question will require analysis of the actual health outcomes of introducing the contract, rather 
than (as in our study) estimates of likely outcomes.  It will require evidence not only on the 
benefits of the contract – in particular, the health benefits of the increased activity in QOF 
areas – but also on the opportunity costs in terms of resources and staff time invested in QOF 
activities rather than other activities that might benefit population health.  For example, staff 
may divert their time away from discussions with the patient aimed at providing information 
and reassurance – despite the award of patient experience points for exceeding the target of 
at least eight minutes average consultation length [2].  This in turn may impact on patient 
compliance, with consequent harms to population health.  Identifying potential harms of this 
kind will be difficult, because the contract will of course only generate routine data on QOF 
activities.  Data on other activities in primary care will remain hard to gather, as will data on 
clinical outcomes.  Rigorous evaluation of this ambitious and expensive social experiment will 
therefore be a substantial challenge. 
CHE Research Paper  3 
 
 
 
7
 
5. References 
 
1. Department of Health.  Investing in General Practice: The New General Medical 
Services Contract.  London: Department of Health, 2003. 
2. Smith PC, York N. Quality incentives: the case of UK general practitioners.  Health 
Affairs 2004; 23(3): 112-118. 
3. Roland M. Linking Physicians' Pay to the Quality of Care - A Major Experiment in the 
United Kingdom.  New England Journal of Medicine 2004; 351(14): 1448-1454. 
4. Scott T, Maynard A.  Will the new GP contract lead to cost effective medical practice?  
University of York: Centre for Health Economics, 1991.  (Discussion Paper 82). 
5. BMA and NHS Confederation.  Investing in General Practice: The New General 
Medical Services Contract.  Supporting documentation.  BMA London, 2003. 
6. McColl A, Roderick P, Gabbay J, Smith H, Moore M. Performance indicators for 
primary care: an evidence based approach BMJ 1998; 317:1354-1360. 
7. Greenhalgh T, Eversley J.  Quality in general practice.  Kings Fund Publishing, 
London, 1999. 
8. Dixon M, Sweeney K.  A Practical Guide to Primary Care Groups and Trusts.  
Radcliffe Medical Press, Oxford, 2000. 
9. Cleland JGF, McGowan J, Clark A.  The evidence for beta blockers in heart failure. 
BMJ 1999; 318:824-5. 
10. Maynard A, Bloor K.  Health Policy Matters Issue 8, 2003 available at 
http://www.york.ac.uk/healthsciences/pubs/hpm8final.pdf.  Accessed 04/11/04. 
 
